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Article 2

Moral Character: The Personal and the Political
Deborah L. Rhode*
I.
For most of this nation's history, legal ethics was a field of relative neglect, both in scholarly thought and public discourse. That
pattern has recently begun to change, in part because of the support and interest that this endowed lecture series on ethics reflects.
I am pleased to be part of this series, although I should perhaps
confess a few qualms about the particular subject for discussion.
When I initially received the suggestion to talk about moral character, my immediate reaction was reluctance. Although recent
events make it a timely subject, it is also one that I have previously
pursued at unseemly length.' Academics justifiably may feel uneasy about returning to the published scenes of their youthful indiscretions. In many cases, they will find themselves in remarkable
agreement with what they have already said, which leaves them in
an unbecoming position of offering unoriginal variations on earlier
themes. Alternatively, they may find themselves in the equally
awkward position of having to recant, which may leave their audience wondering why authors should be believed the second time
when they couldn't get it right the first.
Yet even as I counseled myself to leave this topic, current events
conspired to tempt my return. Over this past year, moral character as a professional credential has been a topic of increasing interest. More and more private indiscretions have become public
knowledge in political campaigns, judicial confirmation hearings,
and even state bar admission procedures. Under these circumstances, to decline comment seemed almost imprudent. How often
do academics receive invitations to talk about drugs and sex and
call it scholarship?
* Professor of Law, Stanford Law School; Director of the Institute for Research on
Women and Gender, Stanford University; B.A., 1974, J.D., 1977, Yale University. This
article was presented on April 7, 1988, at Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
The lecture was made possible by a grant from the law firm of Baker and McKenzie. The
comments of Peter Chadwick, Lawrence Friedman, Robert Post, and Judith Lichtenberg,
the research assistance of Paul Lomio and the manuscript assistance of Mathew Dubuque
are gratefully acknowledged.
1. Rhode, Moral Character as a ProfessionalCredential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985).
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What particularly intrigued me about the subject was that recent
discussions about the character of political candidates often echoed
the debate about character among applicants to the bar. Having
already taken the position that much of the inquiry in bar admission procedures is inappropriate, I began wondering whether the
same arguments were applicable to selection processes for other
individuals involved in shaping the law. What implications might
this recent political debate about character have for our professional regulatory structures?
With these questions in view, let me suggest that most responses
fall into three general categories. One approach, traditionally applicable to members of the bar and now increasingly extended to
political candidates, advocates a broad inquiry into character. Any
conduct that violates the law or compromises widely shared moral
principles is relevant to individual fitness and is appropriate for
public scrutiny. A second approach denies that much of the information we have unearthed about personal conduct is sufficiently
predictive of future performance to be worth the cost of exposure.
A final, more contextual approach, views such conduct as relevant
in some circumstances for some positions, but emphasizes the need
for better ways of identifying when and how much.
It is, of course, possible to be critical of all the above positions,
and I admit to leaning in that direction. However, I also recognize
that it is somewhat unseemly to initiate a discussion of important
ethical issues, propose three possible resolutions, pronounce all of
them deeply flawed, and call it a day. So, if forced to choose, I'll
place myself reluctantly in the contextual camp.
This contextual framework acknowledges that certain forms of
personal behavior are insufficiently predictive of professional conduct to justify the costs of public scrutiny. Only where a crucial
part of a crucial job involves moral leadership will extended moral
oversight be appropriate. As a general matter, individuals holding
positions of judicial and governmental leadership should expect
more exacting scrutiny than those engaged in more routine legal
practice. What sorts of personal conduct are relevant to a given
position involves contextual judgments that the following discussion will explore in some detail. But underlying this discussion is a
more general point. However one resolves particular cases, it is
critical that the process of decision making become more reflective
than traditionally has been the case. Those directly involved in
character evaluation - including journalists, judges, and bar officials - need to subject their own evaluative standards to more
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rigorous moral scrutiny. That process, in turn, should suggest the
need for fundamental changes in both our legal and journalistic
ethics.
II.
Those who support broad inquiries into moral character for all
political and legal positions generally make two claims. The first is
that lawyers, judges, and politicians occupy positions of public
trust. To safeguard the interests of society in general and those of
clients, litigants, and constituents in particular, it is critical to
screen out candidates who are likely to abuse their positions.
Given the difficulties of ousting incumbents or of rectifying the injury they cause, some preliminary inquiry into honesty, integrity,
and moral judgment seems advisable to prevent harm before it occurs. Character cannot always be compartmentalized and the
qualities that individuals display in their personal lives may spill
over to professional relationships. 2
A second rationale for character inquiry involves issues of image. Those charged with making, administering, or upholding the
law should not have defiled it. In order to maintain respect for
legal and governmental processes, individuals holding positions of
public responsibility should behave responsibly in their personal as
well as professional lives.
Of course, as subsequent discussion will suggest, there are important differences in our expectations for different offices and in
our processes for moral inquiry. The degree of probity we demand
in Supreme Court nominees is not what we accept in county commissioners, and the degree of self-regulation we permit for the organized bar is not what we allow for other vocational groups.
Nevertheless, our rationales for character inquiry in all of these
contexts are quite similar and they are vulnerable on several
grounds.
A threshold difficulty involves the marginal relevance of much
of the information that emerges from inquiries by bar character
committees and political journalists. Underlying these inquiries is
the assumption that character reflects consistent personality traits,
and that individuals who exhibit dishonesty or disrespect for law in
See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957); G. SHAR173 (3d ed. Philadelphia 1869).
3. See In re Wolff, 490 A.2d 1118 (D.C. App. 1985); E. DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS AND CIvic MORALS (1957); Farley, CharacterInvestigation of Applicantsfor Admission, 24 B. EXAMINER 147, 158 (1955); Rhode, supra note 1, at 509-11 nn.82-93.
2.

SWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
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one context will do so in another. Yet a vast array of social science
research suggests that this assumption is, to a large extent, a "figment of our aspirations." 4 Contextual factors play a critical role in
shaping moral behavior and little correlation is apparent between
seemingly similar character traits, such as lying and cheating.
Even slight changes in situational variables can substantially affect
tendencies toward deceit. For example, studies of students indicate
that it is impossible to predict cheaters in French from cheaters in
math.'
If we cannot reliably make those sorts of predictions, it is hard
to defend the far more attenuated inferences that underlie character assessments in bar admission proceedings and political campaigns. It is doubtful that any systematic study would confirm a
frequent reaction to the Gary Hart affair, which was that anyone
who would lie to his wife would find it easier to lie to voters with
"whom he has a less intimate relationship."' 6 Whatever else one
may say about infidelity in marriage, history does not disclose it to
be a particularly accurate predictor of infidelity to constituents.
Compare, for example, Richard Nixon and Franklin Delano
Roosevelt. It is equally implausible to expect a close connection
between performance in office and much of the other character information that emerged during recent judicial and political investigations. Such information included Bruce Babbitt's use of
marijuana in college; Pat Robertson's efforts to disguise the illegitimacy of his son's birth decades ago; Dan Quayle's fraternity antics; Robert Bork's choices in home video rentals; Douglas
Ginsburg's operation of a dating service while in college; and Ginsburg's wife's performance of abortions during her medical
training.7
The costs of this form of "character" inquiry are not born by
4.

Rosenhan, Moral Character,27 STAN. L. REV. 925, 926 (1975).
5. H. HARTSHORN & M. MAY, STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER: STUDIES
IN DECEIT, BOOK 1 377-90, 407-12; H. HARTSHORN & M. MAY, STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER, BOOK 2 211-21. See also W. MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND AS-

25-26 (1968); Bern & Allen, On Predicting Some of the People Some of the
Time, The Search for Cross-SituationalConsistencies in Behavior, 81 PSYCHOLOGICAL
REV. 506, 506-07 (1974); Rhode, supra note 1, at 556-62 nn.292-326.
6. Wyse, The Way We Are, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Sept. 1987, at 286. See also
Gersh, Miami Herald v. Gary Hart, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, May 9, 1987, at 15; Kinsley, TRB: On the Zipper Beat, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 25, 1987, at 4 ("[tjhe same
juices that drive politicians to run for office drive many to horse around and may drive
some to express themselves in other ways, like starting wars").
7. Ginsburg Withdraws as Court Nominee Citing Clamor on Drugs, N.Y. Times, November 8, 1987, at 18, col. 3 [hereinafter Ginsburg Withdraws]; Hevst, Gore and Babbitt
Admit Marijuana Use in Past, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, at 18, col. 1.
SESSMENT
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candidates and their families alone. Society also suffers when its
choices for leadership narrow to those willing to put their entire
life histories on public display. Under the watchful eye of reporters
scrambling for a scoop, most biographies will reveal something
that is frayed around the ethical edges. Our nation has a limited
supply of saints, and it is unclear how many will be willing and
able to withstand our lengthening journalistic gauntlets.
Even more troubling is the risk that this kind of character scrutiny will deflect attention from more serious issues. As it is, the
public's attention span is limited, and stories about sex are inevitably more sexy than those about farm price supports. Even after
San Antonio's highly regarded mayor, Henry Cisneros, had withdrawn his candidacy for elective office, new revelations of his adultery eclipsed discussion of his administration's performance.'
Front page coverage focused on whether Dan Quayle whispered
sweet nothings in the ear of then lobbyist and later Playboy model,
Paula Parkinson. Of far less interest was Quayle's undistinguished
Senate performance, his questionable Congressional campaign tactics, and his subordination of political responsibilities to personal
interests.9 Similarly, a number of facts about Douglas Ginsburg's
professional conduct raised serious ethical questions, including his
affidavits concerning prior trial experience and his insensitivity to
potential conflicts of interest while an official in the Justice Department."° But it was marijuana use that captured public attention
and prompted a series of true confessions by political candidates
about their student smoking behavior. At the same time media
leaders were dismissing such revelations as gratuitous, a national
opinion poll reported that over a quarter of surveyed Americans
would refuse to vote for a presidential candidate who had used ma8. Applebone, Disclosure of San Antonio Mayor's Infidelity Brings Pain and Questions
About Process, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1978, at All, col. 3.
9. See Cato, The View From the Hill, NATIONAL REVIEW, Sept. 16, 1988, at 24 (noting Quayles's undistinguished political performance and sponsorship of special tax breaks
for professional golfers); Hosenball, Fore, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 12-15, 1988, at 18
(describing Quayle's inadequate record and concessions to his golf schedule); Sheehy,
Just Danny, VANITY FAIR, Nov. 1988, at 152; A Media 'FeedingFrenzy'?, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 29, 1988, at 20, 25 (noting that Quayle had labeled himself a Vietnam-era veteran in
his brutal Senate campaign); The Quayle Quagmire, TIME, Aug. 21, 1988, at 18, 22, 25
(discussing Senate campaign tactics, record, and Parkinson allegations).
10. Inquiry on Ginsberg Advances, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1987, at A11, col. 1; Ginsberg's Role in Cable TV Case is Investigated, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1987, at A9, col. 1;
Behind the Ginsburg Smoke, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1987, at A34, col. 1; Ginsberg Had
Two Roles in a Pension Case, Documents Show, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, at A36, col. 1;
Cabinet Official Bids Ginsberg End High Court Quest, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1987, at Al,
col. 1; Ginsberg Faces Queries Over Cable TV, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4,1987, at D30, col. 1.
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rijuana in college. 1
Judging from recent allocations of media attention, not enough
observers shared the view of one irate television talk show listener
who informed Gary Hart that she was "sick of hearing about [his]
sleeping habits." What bothered her was not hearing about his 1.4
million dollars in unpaid campaign debts. 12 Yet that issue, as well
as much of the other "character" evidence available from a fifteen
year career in public service, received a tiny fraction of the attention devoted to Hart's marital infidelity. His "Monkey Business"
in Bimini made page one; his tax proposals made page twenty-two.
While defenders of the press stakeouts of Hart's boudoir generally maintained that the issue was judgment, many readers were
clearly more interested in sex. In one national opinion poll, over a
third of those surveyed indicated that they would refuse to vote for
a candidate who was unfaithful to his wife, even if they agreed with
him on most issues.13 Because the possibility of a woman candidate apparently escaped pollster's notice, it is unclear whether a
double standard for politicians survives. In any case, it is not encouraging that such a substantial constituency would attach overriding importance to adultery, irrespective of surrounding
circumstances. Nor is it comforting that the amount of press coverage concerning sex and drugs among candidates and their families has dwarfed coverage of professional misconduct among many
14
existing government officials.
Once we license a general inquiry into candidates' personal lives,
the risk is that a Gresham's law of journalism will prevail. All it
takes is one reporter with a peephole perspective. As soon as a
scandal breaks in any major media outlet, it becomes difficult for
other members of the press to remain above the fray. The kind of
"let the public decide" philosophy that currently guides character
investigation encourages the media to pander to our worst instincts.' 5 To make national press conferences into open forums on
adultery demeans not only candidates but ourselves. It encourages
11. See Ginsberg Withdraws, supra note 7.
12. Hart's 1984 Debts Make the 1988 Campaigns Nervous, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1988,
§ 8, at 4, col. 1.
13. Poll Finds Infidelity A Lesser Evil Than Others in Picking Candidates, N.Y.
Times, May 8, 1987, at Al, col. 4.
14. For a list of 110 Reagan Administration officials accused of unethical conduct,
see Washington Post, April 27, 1986, at A12, col. 1. Most of the abuses (which ranged
from substantial financial conflicts of interest to reliance on government chauffeurs for
picking up laundry) received comparatively little attention outside of Washington.
15. Kinsley, supra note 6, at 41; Judd, The HartAffair, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
July-Aug. 1987, at 25.
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a climate in which leading journalists believe that the exposure of
"human folly is valuable for its own sake, and that if politicians are
going to run our lives, the
least we can expect in return is... some
6
entertainment value." 1
The effects of that ethos are not readily contained. As Anthony
Lewis has noted, "each vulgarity makes the next easier."' 7 More
and more political figures are becoming targets of the kind of scrutiny once reserved for Hollywood celebrities, complete with roundthe-clock surveillance tactics. In the aftermath of the Hart
stakeout, the New York Times proposed a more genteel but equally
invasive means of obtaining extensive personal information: just
ask candidates voluntarily to supply it. Among other things, the
New York Times requested copies of high school transcripts, marriage licenses, medical records, and blanket permission to discuss
medical histories with physicians.' 8 Even some of the most ardent
first amendment defenders were a bit uncomfortable with this demand. As a former Washington Post managing
editor suggested,
' 19
"better they should ask about adultery."
To assess the price of such character inquiries, some historical
perspective is useful. For example, would society in general, and
the civil rights movement in particular, be better off if the national
media had trumpeted the "truth" about the sexual activities of
Martin Luther King, minister of the cloth? As Warren and Brandeis' celebrated article on privacy noted, gossip "both belittles and
perverts ... [b]y inverting the relative importance of things ....
[I]t usurps the place of interest in brains capable of other things." 20
Similar points are applicable to character inquiries for lawyers.
In both admission and disciplinary contexts, the process has been
inconsistent, idiosyncratic, and unnecessarily intrusive. Although
only a tiny percentage of bar applicants have been formally denied
admission, a significant number have been deterred, delayed, and
harassed. So too, while the number of lawyers disbarred for non16. Kinsley, supra note 6, at 4.
17. Lewis, After the Fall, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1987, at 25, col. 1. See Bain, Private
Sex and Public Exposure, MACLEANS, May 25, 1987, at 48; Hertzberg, Sluicegate, NEW
REPUBLIC, June 1, 1987, at 11.
18. Goodman, Request Goes Too Far,B. Globe, June 4,1987, at 9, col. 1; Dole Berates
Press - 'Gossip, Nit-Picking" S.F. Chronicle, April 27, 1988, at A12, col. 5.
19. Goodman, supra note 18 (quoting Howard Simons).
20. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). See A.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1970); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89
YALE L. J. 421 (1980); Gererty, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARVARD C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233
(1977).
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professional misconduct has been equally small, the arbitrariness of
standards has been equally troubling.
Here a historical footnote is instructive, although not particularly inspiring. Prior to this century, the process for screening applicants was, for the most part, ritualistic. In the nineteenth
century, the only substantial groups excluded were females and
convicted felons.2 The first major Supreme Court case on point
gives a sense of the problems to follow. The case involved Myra
Bradwell, a publisher of a prominent Chicago legal periodical,
whose character deficiencies were fundamental and irredeemable.
She was female and the "Law of the Creator" decreed that women's destiny was domesticity. Many nineteenth-century jurists
apparently shared Alexander Pope's conclusion that women either
had "no character at all" or had one of the wrong types.22 Within
the legal profession, the general consensus was that the "peculiar
qualities of womanhood," its "gentle graces, quick sensibility...
and tender susceptibility," were not qualifications for "forensic
strife."

23

Although by the early twentieth century the Creator's will had
apparently reversed itself regarding women, the standards for character scrutiny remained no less problematic. Those disbarred or
denied entrance formed a motley collection, including convicted
felons, suspected subversives, indiscreet adulterers, and overly-blatant self-promoters. 24 Class, racial, and ethnic biases were sometimes pronounced. In the late 1920s, for example, Pennsylvania's
rigorous pre-law and post-law school screening system was particularly effective in filtering out the most lumpen of the proletariat.
In 1929, one county board excluded individuals whom it variously
characterized as "dull," "colorless," "subnormal," "unprepossessing," "shifty," "smooth," "keen," ".shrewd," "arrogant," "conceited," "surly," and "slovenly.

' 25

During the first eight years the

system was in place, the proportion of Jewish candidates who
passed moral muster dropped by sixteen percent and almost no
blacks gained entry.26
21.

Rhode, supra note 1, at 496-98.

22.

A. POPE, MORAL ESSAYS: IN FOUR EPISTLES TO SEVERAL PERSONS (1781).

23. In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875). See also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring); Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Wo-

men, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1988).
24. See Rhode, supra note 1,at 500-01.
25. Douglas, The Pennsylvania System Governing Admission to the Bar, 54 REP.
A.B.A. 701, 703-05 (1929).
26. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 112-14 (1976).
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The Cold War era marked another period of rigorous scrutiny,
as character committees searched diligently for evidence of "pinkish" sympathies. 2 George Anastaplo, now a distinguished faculty
member at Chicago's Loyola University, was a case in point; his
bar application essay defending the right of revolution as set forth
in the Declaration of Independence was sufficient to prompt questions of unfitness.2 s
Character inquiry in disciplinary proceedings has raised similar
concerns. Once admitted to the bar, practitioners generally can be
excommunicated only for conduct involving "moral turpitude," a
standard open to indeterminate and idiosyncratic interpretation.
Even within the same jurisdictions, different committees have expressed different views of conduct ranging from anarchism to personal income tax violations.29
To take only the most colorful examples, the bar's early pronouncements regarding promiscuity generated a collection of
somewhat murky moral mandates. To a 1929 Missouri court, seduction by an unfulfilled promise to marry constituted an act of
"baseness and depravity" warranting disbarment.3 ° By contrast, to
a New Jersey court around the same period, statutory rape of a
fifteen year old was forgivable in light of the attorney's previously
"upright" record and the girl's more tainted reputation. 31 Again,
class biases have been apparent. Seducing one's secretary has been
thought discreditable but not disabling; seducing a prominent society matron and wife of a war hero has been grounds for
disbarment.32
Although both admission and disciplinary systems have improved over time, certain problems remain. The first is the possibility for arbitrary and intrusive decision making. Existing
definitions of character are circular, conclusory, or both. In most
cases, courts simply announce that the applicant is or is not fit,
sometimes without even disclosing the factual basis for their judg27. Brown & Fasset, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 480,
494 (1953).
28. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 98-102
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting). See Anastaplo, What is Still Wrong with George Anastaplo?
A Sequel to 366 U.S. 82 (1961), 35 DE PAUL L. REV. 551 (1986); Papke, The Watergate
Lawyers All Passed the Character and Fitness Committee, 2 COLUM. U.F. 15, 17-18
(1973).
29. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 552-53.
30. In re Wallace, 323 Mo. 203, 206, 19 S.W.2d 625, 629 (1929).
31. In re Isserman, 6 N.J. Misc. 146, 148, 140 A. 253, 253 (1928).
32. Compare Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 274-78, 152 A. 292, 29495 (1930) with State v. Byrkett, 3 Ohio N.P. 28 (1896).
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ments. Rarely are the premises guiding the decision acknowledged, let alone defended. 3
The indeterminacy of standards has both reflected and reinforced a screening process of equally unguided scope. Applicants
for admission must provide a broad array of information that in
some jurisdictions extends to parking violations and high school
extracurricular activities. My prior empirical survey of character
committees revealed that in eighty percent of the states, candidates
might run into difficulties for membership in leftist political organizations or for misdemeanor convictions resulting from civil disobedience. 34 Forty percent of surveyed jurisdictions would or might
investigate cohabitation or homosexual conduct. Although contemporary studies suggest that some three-quarters of all college
undergraduates have either cohabited or have expressed a willingness to do so if the opportunity arose, some bar committees have
recently denied, deferred, or humiliated candidates on that basis. 35
Over a third of all states demand the records of divorce proceedings, and a substantial percentage of states make inquiries about
voluntary mental health treatment.3 6 In most cases, even trained
mental health clinicians cannot accurately predict future psychological incapacities on the basis of past treatment; yet untrained
bar examiners have routinely attempted such predictions.37
The refusal to provide such information or even an inadvertent
failure to disclose remote activities can of itself constitute grounds
for exclusion. George Anastaplo was denied admission because of
his refusal to answer questions about political affiliations that
would not of themselves have been a constitutionally legitimate basis for rejection. 38 In the more recent and celebrated case of Edward Loss, a rehabilitated drug offender with an exemplary law
school record, a majority of the Illinois Supreme Court denied certification but declined to "lengthen [its] opinion" by identifying the
33. Rhode, supra note 1, at 529-31. For a recent illustration, see In re Loss, 119 Ill.
2d 186, 518 N.E.2d 981 (1987).
34. Rhode, supra note 1, at 568-69.
35. For a discussion of cohabitation rates, see Macklin, Non-Marital Heterosexual
Cohabitation, 1 MARRIAGE AND FAM. REV., 1, 2 (1978); Spanier, Married and Unmarried Cohabitation in the United States, 45 J. MARRIAGE AND FAM. REV. 277 (1983). For
discussions of committee decisions, see Rhode, supra note 1, at 532-37, 581-83.
36. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 571-88.
37. For problems of predicting psychological difficulties, see sources cited in Kaslaw,
Moral, Emotional and PhysicalFitnessfor the Bar: Pondering (Seeming) Imponderables,
B. EXAMINER, 38, 41 (Aug. 1980); Note, Selective Incapacities: Reducing Crime Through
Prediction of Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511 (1982).
38. Anastaplo, supra note 28, at 567-69.
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factual basis for its conclusion. a9
As even this brief overview suggests, the costs of such a system
are substantial. Part of the price is consistently inconsistent judgments. Many of the same offenses, such as bankruptcy, bounced
checks, marijuana use, and participation in student protests, are
treated differently within and across jurisdictions. 4° Even when applied to dissimilar conduct, prevailing criteria yield peculiar results. For example, during the early 1980s, one local Michigan
character committee refused to certify an applicant who had violated a fishing license statute a decade earlier. In the same state
around the same time, examiners on the bar's central committee
admitted applicants convicted of child molesting and conspiracy to
bomb a public building.4 ' Such decision making is a mockery of
due process - of standards for consistency, regularity, and fair
notice that the bar has so valiantly fought to establish in other
contexts.
Moreover, the intrusiveness of current character proceedings has
other costs. The risk of problems with the bar may chill protected
political activity or discourage those with psychological difficulties
from seeking treatment. Those who refuse to be intimidated may
be subject to harassment, delay, and occasionally to denial. By extending scrutiny to relatively unimportant matters, the bar risks
trivializing the entire character inquiry. Worse still, the judgments
of unfitness that have too often emerged from this process - involving political activists, conscientious objectors, acknowledged
homosexuals, and rehabilitated offenders - subvert principles that
the profession seeks to sustain.4 2
Analogous points are applicable to bar disciplinary systems. Indeed, a comparison of the two processes suggests considerable selectivity in the bar's commitment to moral oversight. At the
admission stage, character committees deny, delay, or deter applicants with minor misconduct on the theory that they might commit serious professional abuses. At the disciplinary stage, however,
the vast majority of those who have committed such abuses escape
significant sanctions.43
In re Loss, 119 Ill. 2d 186, 197, 518 N.E.2d 981, 985 (1987).
Rhode, supra note 1, at 542-46.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 569-70. See also In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); Brown & Fasset,
note 27.
For a summary of almost two decades of studies beginning with the ABA Clark
Report in 1970, see G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBIL-

39.
40.
41.
42.
supra
43.

ITY AND REGULATION (2d ed. 1988).
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The problems in existing disciplinary processes have been canvassed elsewhere and need not be rehearsed here. It is sufficient to
note that major studies consistently have found these procedures
inadequate in responding to professional misconduct.' It is also
ironic that the bar is willing to penalize applicants who have shown
disrespect for law in a wide range of contexts, including cohabitation or non-payment of parking fines and child support awards.
Yet after admission, the same conduct never triggers scrutiny
uphold the
among practitioners. Those who have already sworn to
45
it.
violate
they
when
latitude
greatest
law receive the
This double standard in admission and discipline has not always
escaped attention among the public it theoretically serves to protect. In commenting on the Loss case, columnist Mike Royko reviewed the recent list of Illinois attorneys who had committed
major felonies and serious professional misconduct but were reinstated to practice. As Royko noted, those imprisoned for crimes
committed as attorneys were able to retain their licenses, even
apparently pulled himself out of trouble [was]
though a "man who
46
denied a chance.
This is not to imply that the bar has been unfailingly tolerant of
collegial misconduct. Rather, as prior discussions of moral turpitude suggested, character inquiries in disciplinary as well as admission proceedings have reflected inconsistent, intrusive, and
idiosyncratic judgments. Cases concerning non-professional conduct, such as those involving sex, drugs, or assault, have produced
widely differing results and little reasoned analysis. 47 Often, the
44. Id.; Rhode, The Rhetoric of ProfessionalReform, 45 MD. L. REV. 274 (1986).
45. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 546-55 nn.241-85.
46. Royko, Lets Get to Bottom of Ed Loss Affair, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 20, 1987, § 1,
at 3, col. 1; see also Royko, High Court Misses the Point of Law, Chicago Tribune, Aug.
18, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
47. For example, courts sometimes view illegal sexual conduct as evidence of a disorder unrelated to practice and allow attorneys to retain their licenses. See, e.g., In re
Kimmel, 322 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 1982) (homosexual assault of minor viewed as dysfunction similar to alcoholism; practice restricted to title searches for four years); In re Addonizio, 95 N.J. 121, 469 A.2d 492. (1984) (three month suspension for undisclosed
"aberrational" sex offense); In re Martin, 112 Wis. 2d 661, 334 N.W.2d 107 (1983) (sixmonth suspension for contributing to the delinquency of a minor). In other instances,
courts view such conduct as moral turpitude justifying disbarment. See People v.
Grenemyer, 745 P.2d 1027 (Colo. 1985) (consensual sex with boy under 15); In re Wolff,
490 A.2d 1118 (D.C. App. 1988) (distribution of child pornography); In re Levinson, 444
N.E.2d 1175 (Ind. 1983) (exhibitionism). See also Committee on Prof. Ethics v. Tompkins,
415 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa 1987) (two-year suspension and treatment for attorney convicted
of trespass while searching for female undergarments); Committee on Prof. Ethics v.
Fray, 334 N.W.2d 739 (Iowa 1983) (18-month suspension for obscene phone calls).
For varying views on assaults, compare Carter v Cianci, 482 A.2d 1201 (R.I. 1984)
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relative priorities in bar enforcement seem more related to public
image than protection. Two 1983 cases from Indiana are illustrative. One involved an attorney convicted of growing marijuana.
The other involved a lawyer who had repeatedly neglected and
deceived clients and improperly withheld their funds. The farmer
48
was disbarred; his colleague received a forty-five day suspension.
If this is protecting the public, we need to rethink our definition of
protection.
III.
Such considerations have led some commentators to an alternative approach toward character issues, one which seeks to distinguish between the personal and the political, the private and the
professional. In effect, this position is that those interested in public office or legal practice should not be subject to scrutiny for conduct that is not directly related to professional performance.
Although the proper scope for character investigation may blur at
the boundaries, matters such as marital fidelity or marijuana use at
private gatherings should remain off limits. This position has
much to commend it when lawyers are regulating lawyers. However, problems arise when certain highly visible political and judicial offices are at issue, and certain ostensibly "private" conduct
has public consequences. Where the position entails moral leadership, we may wish to tolerate broader moral scrutiny.
One example involves "womanizing," the charge leveled at Gary
Hart. Underlying that allegation were two sets of objections: one
went to the substance of his sexual activities, the other to the manner in which he conducted them. Although it is not clear that the
(public reprimand for attorney convicted of attacking friend who was having an affair
with the attorney's ex-wife) and In re Kuvara, 97 Wash. 2d 743, 649 P.2d 834 (1982) (no
discipline imposed for "isolated instance" of barroom struggle that had been redressed
through civil and criminal law) with In re McGrath, 98 Wash. 2d 337, 655 P.2d 232
(1982) (disbarment for shooting that arose from barroom quarrel).
For drug use, compare People v. Young, 732 P.2d 1208 (Colo. 1987) (disbarment following conviction for cocaine use and distribution) and In re Thomas, 472 N.E.2d 609
(Ind. 1985) (three-year suspension following conviction for possession of marijuana and
another controlled substance) and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon, 510 Pa. 312,
507 A.2d 1215 (1986) (disbarment based on conviction of not-for-profit cocaine transactions involving acquaintance) with Florida Bar v. Levine, 498 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1986)
(public reprimand for conviction for cocaine use) and In re McLaughlin, 105 N.J. 457,
522 A.2d 999 (1987) (public reprimand following conviction for cocaine purchase) and In
re Kinnear 105 N.J. 391, 522 A.2d 414 (1987) (one-year suspension following conviction
for distribution of cocaine). See generally G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, supra note 43.
48. Compare In re Moore, 453 N.E.2d 971 (Ind. 1983) with In re Holloway, 452
N.E.2d 934 (Ind. 1983).
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two issues can be ultimately separated, both call into question the
public/private boundary that some commentators have sought to
establish.
Leaving aside, for the moment, the issue of the media's own conduct in investigating Hart's activities, the information that
emerged was relevant to his candidacy in two respects. The first
has to do with qualities of honesty and judgment that became apparent in the way Hart publicly responded to personal inquiries.
Rather than refusing to discuss charges of extra-marital relationships, Hart flatly denied them and indeed challenged reporters to
verify his claim. Yet once having painted a picture of marital rectitude, Hart found it difficult to sustain for even a few months, a fact
that inevitably raised doubts about his judgment and self-control.4 9
Moreover, in the face of mounting evidence about his frequent contacts with model Donna Rice, Hart's denial that they had any
"personal relationship" seemed inadequate to the occasion. As a
New York Times editorial wryly inquired, "would 'political' or
'business' relationship better describe it?""0 However, we as individuals judge Hart's underlying conduct, his inability to predict
how the public in general would assess that conduct suggests a
troubling degree of moral myopia.
The lack of discretion with which Hart conducted his personal
life at a critical juncture in his career raises broader concerns. In
some respects, the point is reminiscent of a perhaps apocryphal but
nonetheless telling anecdote about a former president of U.S. Steel.
When forced to resign after his liaison with actress Lillian Russell
became public, the president objected to his board of directors that
he was being penalized for doing publicly what many of them did
behind closed doors. To which the response was, "that's what
doors are for."
But to take a harder case, suppose that Hart had been more discrete and utterly candid about his personal life and insisted that it
had no bearing on his fitness for public office. In a recent interview, Yale Law School Dean Guido Calabresi maintained that
while he could not approve of the conduct culminating in the Rice
affair, his advice to Hart would have been to say:
I have a problem. I have a weakness for beautiful women. It's
not something I'm proud of. It's not something that's good. Its
a weakness. It's made strains on my marriage. If I were to tell
you I would never do that kind of thing again, that would be
49.
50.

Kinsley, supra note 6, at 41.
N.Y. Times, May 5, 1987, at A34, col. 1.
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foolish. You never know. If that is so much of a problem for you
that you cannot vote for me on it, so be it. That is what I am.5 1
Yet to present Hart's conduct in those terms risks trivializing its
significance. A habitual weakness for casual affairs is not like a
weakness for chocolate. Womanizing degrades and "objectifies"
women in general and can be hurtful and humiliating to one woman in particular. It signifies a lack of respect for an individual
with whom one has an intimate relationship and ongoing responsibility. In an age in which divorce is publicly acceptable, an individual's choice to remain married, while repeatedly violating the
commitments it is thought to entail, raises questions of his or her
character. For positions involving moral leadership, those questions are relevant.
That is not to imply that such concerns should be conclusive.
How a candidate treats another person in private life is not, of
course, more critical than how he or she treats their concerns in a
political capacity. What makes for personal goodness is not always
synonymous with what makes for the common good. For the reasons indicated earlier, it would be a mistake to assume that private
conduct will accurately predict public performance. Rather, my
point is that when an important aspect of an important job involves
expressing moral values, it makes sense to consider whether a particular individual can credibly speak for the standards we seek
most to maintain.
Thus, as my introductory remarks suggested, judicial and governmental leaders should attract fuller scrutiny than those engaged
in legal practice. In general, we expect individuals who play prominent roles in shaping or administering the law to abide by its mandates. Whatever our tolerance for hypocrisy in other contexts, we
would prefer that our leaders not - as the proverb has it - preach
water and drink wine.
Again, this does not suggest that any legal violation is conclusive. Context matters. Contrary to some recent judicial censure
cases, it is not self-evident that any allegation of extra-marital sexual activity that arouses "gossip" warrants investigation.5 2 Public
respect for the administration of justice is not necessarily enhanced
by selective application of adultery or sodomy prohibitions. But
51. Liptak, Taking it Personally, YALE ALUMNI MAG., March 1988, at 29.
52. See, e.g., In re Agerter, 353 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 1984) (suggesting that inquiry
into extra-marital liaison would be appropriate if conducted in a public manner raising
community concern); In re Snyder, 336 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1983) (continued adultery
and possible paternity of illegitimate child that became a subject of public gossip was
ground for censure).
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neither do we want Supreme Court Justices who are use illegal
drugs or prominent SEC officials who batter their wives.53 The
reason has nothing to do with attenuated inferences about professional competence. Some individuals with a weakness for marijuana might also have a flair for constitutional jurisprudence.
Most of the country, however, would prefer that they exercise that
talent in positions carrying less symbolic freight.
Practicing law is one possibility. Whatever the public may have
thought about Douglas Ginsburg's suitability for judicial office,
there was no groundswell of opinion calling for his disbarment.
Much as our profession may wish to cling to de Tocqueville's view
of lawyers as the "American aristocracy," wishing does not always
make it so. 54 Opinion polls suggest that a more modest understanding is in order. Compared with other professions, lawyers
rank poorly on the public's scale of virtue." Yet the best way to
combat that perception is not the kind of idiosyncratic moralism
that has too often passed for moral oversight in character proceedings. A more effective approach will require a fundamental rethinking of the profession's regulatory premises and priorities.
In undertaking this reassessment, we should be sensitive to one
other fact that makes character inquiry for lawyers unique and
subject to special concern. Unlike politicians or other professionals, members of the bar are accountable to no other group in selecting their membership. It is not self-evident that society is well
served by granting lawyers this degree of regulatory autonomy.
The earlier overview of moral character procedures suggests some
of the problems with such a structure, this and a review of regulatory processes in other contexts raises similar concerns. 56 But for
53. For a description of John Fedders' resignation as director of enforcement for the
Securities and Exchange Commission after public disclosure of his repeated spousal assaults, see S. KLAIDMAN & J. BEAUCHAMP, THE VIRTUOUS JOURNALIST (1987).
54. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (G. Lawrence trans., J.
Mayer ed. 1969) (1st ed. n.p. 1864).
55. For public opinion poll data and bar concerns, see AMERICAN BAR COMMISSION
ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE; A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYERS' PROFESSIONALISM (1986). For example, Gallup polls between
the mid-1970's and 1980's consistently indicated that over one-quarter of surveyed Americans rated lawyers "low" or "very low" in ethical standards, while only four to six percent rated them very high. See G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, supra note 43, at 27 (citing
Oliver, Lawyers Losing the Verdict in the Court of Public Opinion, L.A. Times, Oct. 19,
1983, at 3, col. 3; Stiebman, Bar Study Finds Public Sees Lawyers as Greedy, Unethical,
S.F.B. Daily J., Dec. 24, 1987, at 1).
56. See FELLMETH, THE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM: AN INITIAL REPORT (1987); HAZARD & RHODE, supra note 43; The Professions and Public Policy (P. Slayton & M.
Trebilock ed. 1978); Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline;Beyond the Bar?
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present purposes, it is sufficient to note that as long as the bar has
so little external accountability in its character determinations,
some special self-restraints and procedural safeguards seem
advisable.
IV.
This is not the occasion for a detailed analysis of alternative
character procedures. I have reviewed specific structural proposals
for the bar elsewhere and suggested ways of limiting investigation,
confining discretion, and redirecting regulatory resources.57 What
bears emphasis here is one final, more general observation about
the recent focus on professional character. If there is any single
lesson that emerges from the debate about moral standards for politicians, judges, and lawyers, it is that we need more of precisely
that kind of debate.
Any self-regulating profession runs the risk of tunnel vision and
neither journalists nor lawyers appear to be an exception. The
pace of life, stress of deadlines, and diffusion of responsibility work
against sustained scrutiny of ethical premises. In contexts lacking
external structures of accountability, professionals can lose perspective on their own frailties. These problems can become especially acute when issues of personal privacy are implicated. The
law provides extraordinarily little protection for bar applicants or
58
public officials who are subject to unnecessarily intrusive inquiry.
What little recourse is available requires the victim to be victimized
twice - once by the initial exposure and again by any remedial
action that further publicizes the material that was intended to be
private. Such considerations impose a special responsibility on
professions that profess to serve the public interest.
At a minimum, that responsibility entails a greater commitment
to self-reflection and self-restraint than has often been apparent.
69 GEO. L.J. 705 (1981). See also Rhode, supra note 44; E. FREIDSON, SOCIOLOGY OF
THE PROFESSIONS (1972); G. GEISEN, PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA (1983).

57. Rhode, supra note 1, at 584-92; Rhode, supra note 44.
58. Bar candidates who refuse to supply information risk denial of certification. See
supra note 38 and accompanying text. For discussion of the highly limited privacy rights
accorded to public figures, see generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). In theory, most state laws provide a remedy for public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts if the "matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1959). In practice, however, the few plaintiffs who are willing to sue on those grounds almost never win. See M. France, How Far is too Far?
Journalistic Ethics and the Invasion of Privacy (unpublished manuscript, Stanford, Cal.
1988).
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Politics always has been partly about perceptions and journalists'
own perceptions can often redirect our national debate. In a society increasingly dominated by "image politics," the press bears a
heavy responsibility for constructing the images it purports to describe. 9 For all its concerns about exposing the petty foibles and
moral frailties of others, the press has been notably uninterested in
subjecting its own processes to public criticism. The politics of
character have been newsworthy; the character of news gathering
has not. There has been comparatively little effort to explore journalistic ethics in any systematic fashion. What voluntary ethical
standards currently exist leave most of the hard questions unacknowledged and unaddressed. 6° One brief effort to establish a National News Council that would review conduct of cooperating
members sparked little interest outside the profession and little
support within it.6 1 Recent events, however, suggest more encour-

aging trends. A number of incidents in the last few years sparked
new interest in journalistic ethics and the reporting on Gary Hart
and Dan Quayle has heightened those concerns.62
For the legal profession, occasions like this lecture series may
59. J. Lichtenberg, The Politics of Character and the Character of Journalism (unpublished manuscript, Center for Philosophy and Public Affairs, Maryland 1988).
60. KLAIDMAN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 53; R. MEYER, ETHICAL JOURNALISM:
A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS, PRACTITIONERS AND CONSUMERS (1987); Garment, Can the
Media Be Reformed?, COMMENTARY, Aug. 1987, at 37. The American Society of Newspaper Editors Statement of Principles (adopted 1975) provides simply that: "Journalists
should respect the rights of people involved in the news, observe the common standards
of decency, and stand accountable to the public for the fairness and accuracy of their
news reports." The Associated Press Managing Editors Association Code of Ethics
(adopted 1975) rests with the assertion that a good newspaper is "fair, accurate, honest,
responsible, independent and decent." In relevant part, the Washington Post Standards
and Ethics (issued 1977) maintains "the paper shall observe the decencies that are obligatory upon a private gentleman." See M. France, supra note 58.
The most complete discussion of privacy-related concerns occurs in the Society of Professional Journalists (Sigma Delta Chi) which includes, under the general definition of
"Fair Play":
1. The news media should not communicate unofficial charges affecting reputation or moral character without giving the accused a chance to reply.
2. The news media must guard against invading a person's right to privacy.
3. The media should not pander to morbid curiosity about details of vice and
crime.
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, SIGMA DELTA CHI, JOURNALISM ETHICS
REPORT 1 (1988-89).

61. KLAIDMAN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 53, at 225; Garment, supra note 60.
62. See KLAIDMAN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 53, at 225; Garment, supra note 60.
See also, R. CLURMAN, BEYOND MALICE (1988); Rosenthal, Special to the Miami Herald, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1987, at 35, col. 1; Berke, Coverage of Quayle is Unfair, 55% of
Voters Say in Survey, N.Y. Times, at 17, col. 1 (55% of surveyed voters felt coverage of
Quayle was unfair and 69% felt it was excessive).
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help to play a similar role. It is somewhat awkward to end on that
note; when a commentator invites further commentary, the invitation has an uncomfortably self-validating tone. But in this instance
forgiveness may be in order precisely because there are so few opportunities for such a dialogue. Too many debates in this area
have too little public visibility or accountability. Given the ill-defined and in some instances ill-conceived standards of character we
have invoked, the time has come to explore our understanding
more openly and systematically. Oscar Wilde once reminded us
that to be good according to conventional definitions was not necessarily demanding. All it required was a certain reflexive timidity
and "lack of imaginative thought.

' 63

To have character may be

something else again, and we would do well to consider the
difference.

63.

0. WILDE, THE CRITIC AS ARTIST (1890).

